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FOREWORD 
A dynamical description of an abstract cognitive system which should be 
closer t o  some cognitive considerations than pure automata or netwoks of 
automata is proposed. The system operates 'sensory-motorn states, whose 
components are the state of the environment, its variation and the cerebral 
motor activity. 
The main addition is the introduction of a "conceptual control" that  is 
postulated in order to  define a 'learning process", which is a set-valued map 
associating conceptual controls with sensory-motor states. 
A learning process must be consistent with a 'recognition mechanism" 
which determines a t  each instant the set of possible metaphors, linking the 
perception of the environment and its variations with conceptual controls, as 
well as with "viability constraintsndescribing the consumption of the cogni- 
tive system, associating with each state of the environment the set of viable 
motor activities. 
It also has t o  be consistent with an "action lawn, describing the evolution 
of the state of the environment in terms of the cerebral motor activity, and 
a 'motor activitnyn law, describing the evolution of the motor acivity in 
terms of the perception of the environment and the conceptual controls. 
It suggests also that  the evolution of a learning process obeys an "inertia 
principle" which allows to  select specific choices of learning procedures. 
This paper justifies this approach, which can used to  prove mathemat- 
ically the existence of a l a rges t  l ea rn ing  process  and of specific "heavy 
evolutions" obeying an "inertia principle". 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program 
Evolution Laws of a Cognitive System 
We propose in this paper a dynamical description of an abstract cognitive 
system which should be closer to  psychological and physiological motivations 
than pure automata or netwoks of automata. The main additional ingredient 
is the notion of a 'conceptual control" that  we postulate in order t o  define 
learning processes. This requires a "regognition mechanismn which selects 
metaphors linking se'nsori-motor states t o  those conceptual controls. 
We begin by isolating the variables of the cognitive system. We choose 
to  describe them by the state of the cognitive system and a regulatory 
control (conceptual control). The state of the system (henceforth called 
the "sensory-motor  state" ) is described by : 
- the state of the environment on which the cognitive system acts and 
its var ia t ion.  
- the state of cerebral motor activity of the cognitive system, which 
guides his act ion on  the environment.  
The regulatory control of the cognitive system is described by : 
- a n  endogenous cerebral activity which is not genetically programmed, 
but acquired by learning and recorded i n  the memory .  The purpose of this 
activity is to  "interpret" (or "illuminate") the sensory perception of the 
environment, and we shall call i t  the "conceptual  control".  
We should emphasize that  we shall study the evolution both of the state 
of the cognitive system and of its regulatory control. For this purpose, we 
must identify the laws that  constrain and govern the evolution of the system. 
These are as follows : 
- A Recognition Mechan ism,  with genetically programmed evolution, 
which matches the conceptual control to  be chosen with the sensory percep 
tion of the environment and of variations in the environment. 
- A Viabi l i ty Cond i t ion ,  which expresses the fact that  a t  each instant, 
the cognitive system transform the environment by acting upon i t  and 
consuming scarce resources. 
- A n  Act ion Law , which is a law for the evolution of the environment: 
the acceleration of this evolution depends upon both the environment and 
the cerebral motor activity. 
- A M o t o r  Activi ty L a w ,  which is a law for the evolution of the cerebral 
motor activity : the velocity of this evolution depends upon both the sensory 
perception of the environment and its variation and the conceptual control 
(this law is used as a regulatory mechanism). 
According to ideas of Piaget and others, we define 
- A Learning Process, as a nondeterministic feedback m a p  ass* 
ciating a set of conceptual controls (possibly empty )  w i t h  each 
sensory-motor s ta te ,  which is consistent with the viability constraints 
and the recognition mechanism. 
Since a learning process is non deterministic and offer a priori many pos- 
sibilities (contrary to stimuli-response laws), we have to propose a selection 
mechanism. 
We shall postulate that the evolution of conceptual controls obeys a 
L< - inertia principle", which states that whenever a conceptual control "works" 
(i.e., allows to keep the evolution of the cognitive system viable), we keep 
it. 
1 Justifications 
There should be no difficulty in accepting the idea of an environment1 on 
which the cognitive systems act, consuming scarce resourcts and transform- 
ing, creating or destroying this environment2, since the ability to  transform 
the environment has been recognized as one of the characteristics of living 
matter. 
There should also be no problem in accepting the existence of cerebral 
activity which operates the internal organs of the body and the muscular 
activity by which interaction with the environment ia possible. 
The existence of conceptual controls and their use in a recognition mech- 
anism are more questionable assumptions, which we shall at tempt t o  justify 
at several levels. 
- The ambiguous concept of pe rcep t ion  includes both an "objectiven 
and a "subjective" component. The objective component, which we call sen- 
sory perception, is provided by the neuronal circuit activated by the sensory 
receptors. But everyone knows that  there is also a subjective component 
by which this sensory perception is interpreted : this interpretation may 
depend on many factors (previous experiences, emotional state,  attention 
level, etc.), i.e., on a state of cerebral activity independent of the sensory 
inputs. This independent activity represents part of the regulatory control 
which we called conceptual control. 
- If we accept the existence of an endogenous cerebral activity which 
"interprets" the sensory perception of the environment, we must postulate 
the existence of a recognition mechanism which tells us whether a conceptual 
control and the sensory perception of the environment and its variations are 
consistent. 
It seems that  brains have evolved systems which transform information 
on bodily needs and environmental events into cerebral activity producing 
either pleasure (comfort) or pain (discomfort). These systems are known by 
psychologists as mot iva t iona l  eyetems,  and are naturally more sophisti- 
cated than strictly pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding systems. They include 
the emotional system and the homeostatic drive ayatems, which basically 
keep the organism functioning (for example, the hunger drive). 
'both external, in terms of air, water, food, etc., and internal, in terms of the body 
and even the brain. 
'Some four billion years ago the photosynthesis of the first organisms transformed the 
existing atmosphere of methane and ammonia to the oxygenated one we know today -this 
was probably the first example of pollution ! - 
These systems reveal the relation between the perception of the environ- 
ment and the conceptual controls : if these are not consistent the situation 
can be remedied by : 
a)- acting on the environment (for example, by looking for and 
consuming food in the case of hunger); 
b) - changing the conceptual control when action on the environ- 
ment consistent with the existing conceptual control. 
The latter strategy (change of conceptual controls) appears to  be less 
frequent than the first and, for many subsystems (such as the homeostatic 
systems), is quite impossible. This is probably due to  an ine r t i a  princi-  
p le  which we will postulate later, which states that  whenever a conceptual 
control "worksn (i.e., allows to keep the evolution of the cognitive system 
viable), we keep it. 
- The idea of a recognition mechanism based on conceptual controls 
is consistent with the concept of epigenesis. The recognition mechanism 
outlined above is basically a selection mechanism with a definite Darwinian 
flavor, choosing conceptual controls as a function of the environment and 
changes in the environment. By representing the cerebral activity as the flux 
of neurotransmitters in individual synapses (see below), one could suppose 
that  the synapses used most frequently would be stabilized, while those used 
less frequently would deteriorate. But the mere description of the synapses 
which are stabilized after a period of activity is capable of explaining epige- 
nesis only to  the extent that  a road network can determine the routes taken 
by cars - in this case existing travel patterns require the maintenance of 
commonly used routes while the others can be neglected. 
- We also postulated that the evolution of the recognition mechanism 
is programmed genetically. This recognition mechanism is probably rather 
simple : it may just open or close (activate or deactivate) a number of 
neuronal circuits during one or several specified periods of time, allowing 
both the neurotransmitters released by the perception of the environment 
and the conceptual controls to  pass through. 
It seems likely that  some components of this mechanism (which should 
obey the laws of biochemistry) are per iodic  with overlapping periodicity, 
as specialists in chronobiology propose. These components are the many 
biological clocks involved in maintaining the homeostatic equilibrium of the 
organismS. 
'It may be postulated that the recognition of the periodicity of the sun and the moon 
by periodic components of the recognition mechanism in combination with suitable con- 
ceptual controls leads to the concept of time. 
These periodic components of the recognition mechanism probably lie 
a t  the heart of the ability to  recognize regularities and extrapolate them, as 
well as the desire to  look for causal relations. 
Other components of this mechanism are not periodic, but are active 
only during a certain period. This may be illustrated by the phenomenon 
of "imprinting" in ethology : in animal species where the young are able to  
walk almost immediately after birth,the new-born animals follow the first 
moving object that  they perceive, whatever this may be. (In practice, i t  
is usually a parent.) However, this susceptibility does not last indefinitely. 
For example, ducklings can be imprinted only during the first twenty-four 
hours of their life, with sensitivity a t  a maximum between the 14th and 17th 
hours. The crucial factor in imprinting is the mobility of the object t o  be 
imprinted, and this reveals the importance of the perception of variations 
in the environment. 
- The assumption of a recognition mechanism using conceptual con- 
trols allows us t o  explain the adaptability and redundancy of cerebral 
activities. A cognitive system can recognize the same sensory perception 
using different conceptual controls a t  different times - this is redundancy. 
Then, thanks to  the periodic nature of many components of cerebral activi- 
ties, this sensory perception can be "interpretedn in several ways, provoking 
different actions (since we have assumed that the action taken depends upon 
the conceptual controls) - and this is adaptability. 
The components of the recognition mechanism based on one or a small 
number of conceptual controls operate the automatic biological systems (the 
automatic nervous system, etc.), since in this case the subsystem inherits 
the genetic program of the component of the recognition mechanism. 
- The concept of a recognition mechanism reflects the dichotomy 
between "conceptually-driven processesn and "data-driven processesn 
introduced by specialists in cognitive psychology and pattern recognition. 
In this case the data-driven process is the cerebral activity provoked 
by the sensory perception of the environment while the conceptually-driven 
process takes the form of conceptual controls (this is the origin of our ter- 
minology). The idea of a recognition mechanism is also consistent with the 
concept of metaphor, regarded ag a combination of a eensory perception 
of the environment and conceptual control recogniced by the recognition 
mechanism. A feeling of understanding, which amounts t o  a feeling of plea- 
sure, occurs when a metaphor is recognized by the recognition process. Per- 
haps thought processes also fit into this representation, since they involve 
setting up conceptual controls in the form of assumptions and then compar- 
ing them with the perception of the environment. This dynamical process 
of m a k i n g  a n d  m a t c h i n g  seems to  be quite universal. 
- The mathematical metaphor describes a learning proceaa de- 
scribed as a feedback relation which associates a set of conceptual controls 
with each sensory-motor state. The larger the set of conceptual controls 
aesociated with a sensory-motor state, the less deterministic the learning 
process. 
Thisfact  has been observed and emphasizes by Piaget and others when 
they described the learning processes of children. Here, we characterize the 
viable learning processes and we deduce the existence of a largest learning 
process. 
This in consistent with several observed facts. For instance, studies of the 
imprinting phenomenon have shown that  the greater the effort made by the 
young animal to  follow the moving object, the stronger is the imprint. When 
one of the components of the sensory-motor state is suppressed, the learning 
mechanism does not work normally. For instance, if kittens are raised in a 
visual environment composed of black and white vertical lines, they are 
unable to  "seen horizontal stripes later in life. In another experiment, two 
kittens from the same litter spend several hours a day in a contraption 
which allows one kitten fairly complete freedom to  explore and perceive its 
environment while the other is suspended passively in a "gondolan whose 
motion is controlled by the first kitten. Both animals receive the same visual 
stimulation, but the active kitten learns to  interpret these signals to  give it 
an accurate picture of its environment while the passive kitten learns nothing 
and is, in practical terms, "blindn to  the real world. 
One can translate mathematically these laws, as well as the regognition 
mechanism and the viability constraints and define the learning processes 
which are consistent with them (see [ I ] ) .  
Then one can prove a characterization of the learning processes which 
are also consistent with the action law and the motor activity law in a sense 
that  using the conceptual controls provided by the learning process, the 
cognitive system evolves and remains viable. 
One also prove that  given the recognition mechanism, the viability con- 
staints, the action and motor activity laws, there exists a l a rges t  learning 
proceea . 
The inertia principle can br implemented by selecting "heavy viable so- 
lutions", which minimize at each instant (the norm of) the velocity of the 
conceptual controls. Hence one derives from any viable learning process a 
deterministic laws which governs the evolution of the cognitive system. 
The proofs of these theorems rely on Viability Theory and the differential 
calculus of set-valued maps. One cannot avoid the use of set-valued maps 
for defining the recognition mechanism, the viability constraints and the 
learning processes. 
They also use differential inclusions4 and even, differential inclusions 
with memory. 
'The set-valued character of the differential inclusion takes into account the uncertain- 
ties of the events of the environment, the actions of the other cognitive systems, as well 
aa lack of knowledge of the consequences of the motor activity up t o  time t .  
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